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In Monsalvo Velazquez v. Bondi the Supreme Court held that when a voluntary departure deadline under 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b)(2) lands on a weekend or legal holiday, it carries over to the next business day.

Monsalvo Velázquez had been granted 60 days to voluntarily depart the U.S. He filed a motion to reopen on the following Monday after day 60 fell on a Saturday. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Tenth Circuit rejected the motion as late, reading “60 days” to mean calendar days, no exceptions.

The Court reversed. Drawing on longstanding legal and regulatory practice, the majority held that “days” in this context includes the standard rule: deadlines falling on a weekend or holiday extend to the next business day. Congress legislated against that backdrop, and nothing in the statute suggested a break from it.

Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett in part. Alito and Barrett also filed separate dissents.

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In Cunningham v. Cornell University, the Supreme Court addressed a fundamental pleading question under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Petitioners—former and current Cornell University employees—alleged that university fiduciaries violated ERISA §1106(a)(1)(C) by causing their retirement plans to pay excessive fees for recordkeeping services to Fidelity and TIAA-CREF, both parties in interest. The Second Circuit dismissed the claim, holding that plaintiffs must also plead that the transaction wasn’t exempt under §1108(b)(2)(A), which allows for reasonable arrangements with service providers.

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor held that §1106(a)(1)(C) sets out a categorical bar against certain transactions between plans and parties in interest, and plaintiffs need only plausibly plead the elements of that section to state a claim. The §1108 exemptions—such as those permitting “reasonable arrangements” for necessary services—are affirmative defenses that defendants must raise and prove. Citing Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab, the Court emphasized that statutory exemptions laid out in separate provisions do not become part of a plaintiff’s burden unless Congress says otherwise.

Just Sotomayor writing for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurrence, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh.

Read by Jeff Barnum.

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In Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. J.G.G., et al., the Supreme Court granted the government’s application to vacate temporary restraining orders issued by the District Court for the District of Columbia, which had blocked the removal of several Venezuelan detainees allegedly affiliated with the foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (TdA). The detainees challenged President Trump’s Proclamation No. 10903, issued under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA), which authorized their detention and removal.

The Court construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and held that the detainees’ claims must be brought in habeas corpus. Because the claims necessarily challenged the legality of confinement and removal under the AEA, they fell within the “core” of habeas jurisdiction. As such, jurisdiction and venue lay solely in the district of confinement—Texas—not in the District of Columbia. The Court emphasized that equitable relief cannot be sought outside habeas in this context, relying on precedents such as Ludecke v. Watkins and Heikkila v. Barber.

Although the detainees are entitled to judicial review regarding their classification and removal under the AEA—including notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief—the proper venue to litigate those claims is the district of confinement. The Court clarified that such notice must be given promptly to allow detainees to exercise those rights before removal occurs.

Read by RJ Dieken.